This paper concerns a collection of rough-hewn flat stelae excavated from the precinct of Zeus Meilichios in Selinus, Sicily between 1915 and 1926, a majority with two heads or busts, one male and one female, carved at their tops. These crudely fashioned idols are unique in their iconography. They combine the flat inscribed Punic stela with the Greek figural tradition, with some indigenous features. Their meaning is totally obscure – especially since they lack any literary reference. No comparable monuments have (...) been found in ancient Mediterranean cult. The twin stelae were often set up above a collection of burnt rodent and bird bones, ashes, lamps, broken and burnt pottery and terracotta figurines, as a memorial of a sacrifice. The stelae were the objects of a gentilicial cult, similar to that posited for the inscribed “Meilichios stones” with which they shared the Field of Stelae of Zeus Meilichios. The theory advanced here interprets these diminutive stelae as the objects of domestic cult. It was customary in many parts of the ancient Mediterranean, from the Bronze Age down to the Roman period, to venerate household or family gods who protected the health and the wealth of the family. They were thought to embody the spirits of the ancestors and could at times be identified with the gods of the state religion. This divine couple whose effigies were dedicated in the Field of Stelae over a period of four centuries, into the third century, cannot be claimed as Greek or Punic deities. What these nameless protectors of the family were called we cannot say: Meilichios and Meilichia, Father and Mother, or Lord and Lady of the household? As the objects of such a personal domestic cult, their names might have differed with each family. (shrink)

Philosophers have long believed that if the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles were logically true, there would be no problem of individuation. I show (a) that if spatial relations are, as seems plausible, of such a nature that it makes no sense to say of one thing that it is related to itself, then the Principle is a logical truth, asserting that a certain kind of state of affairs is impossible because the kind of sentence purporting to express it (...) is ill-formed and (b) that even if the Principle were such a truth the problem of individuation would remain. I then examine some of what Leibniz and Wittgenstein have said about the notions of individuation, difference and nonidentity. (shrink)

Tractarian Semantics is full of claims that clash with the Tractatus, not to mention each other. There seems to be a method to it though. The book.

Consider a red circle, and suppose it is a paradigmatic thing. Some philosophers maintain that a thing is ontologically analyzable into a particular exemplifying properties, those properties truly ascribed to the thing by the customary words. Our red circle, then, consists of a particular, say a; two properties, red and circle; and exemplification, a tie tying a, red, and circle into “the red circle.” Upon this analysis, a is bare, i.e., not re-recognizable as such, whereas red and circle are natured, (...) i.e., not bare, and, further, are universal, i.e., they may be exemplified by several particulars. (shrink)

In the first place … it will be necessary to explain what an individual substance is. It is indeed true that when several predicates are attributes of a single subject and this subject is not an attribute of another, we speak of it as an individual substance, but this is not enough, and such an explanation is merely nominal. We must therefore inquire what it is to be an attribute in reality of a certain subject. ‘What is a Thing (substance)?’ (...) expresses two quite different problems. One belongs to ontology, the other to categorial analysis. (shrink)

Tractarian Semantics is full of claims that clash with the Tractatus, not to mention each other. There seems to be a method to it though. The book.

Dans le domaine de l’éducation, le partenariat recherche-pratique consiste en l’établissement d’une collaboration fréquente et à long terme entre des praticiens et des chercheurs autour d’objectifs conjointement définis. Le but de cet article est de présenter un état des connaissances sur la façon dont un tel partenariat émerge et se conçoit, à partir d’une recension d’articles publiés sur cette question entre 2010 et 2020. La recension a été articulée selon trois niveaux d’analyse : a) individuel ; b) collectif ; et (...) c) administratif, gouvernance et communauté externe. Un des principaux constats mis en lumière concerne l’influence des éléments du niveau individuel, tel que la relation de confiance, sur certains éléments du niveau collectif, dont la composition et l’organisation des équipes de chercheurs et de praticiens. Il ressort de cette étude que la qualité de la relation de confiance entre les praticiens et les chercheurs peut influencer ou moduler les rôles que les uns et les autres joueront au sein de l’équipe, ainsi que leur engagement. Des pistes de recherche sont aussi présentées. (shrink)

The problem of universals, important in the history of philosophy, remains a crucial issue today not only for metaphysics, but also for the philosophy of science. This anthology offers a comprehensive presentation of twenty-eight analyses of the problem of universals. It opens with analyses presented by Plato and Aristotle and then provides selections from the views of the medieval scholars Abelard, Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and Ockham. It then traces the development of Western thought on this fundamental topic from the modern (...) through the contemporary period and includes the work of Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, Russell, Quine, Strawson, Carnap, and Allaire. To aid the student in understanding these investigations into the nature of universals, each reading is preceded by a concise introduction by the editor. (shrink)

Essays by E. B. Allaire, May Brodbeck, Reinhart Grossmann, Herbert Hochberg and Robert G. Turnbull, most of which have already appeared since 1959. Half of the essays argue answers of a realist type to contemporary statements of traditional ontological problems. The second half of the volume studies the ontological "systems" of Ockhom, Berkeley, Frege, Moore, Wittgenstein, Quine and Dewey from a realistic standpoint. Three previously unpublished essays are included: "Particulars and Time", "Common Names", and "The 'Tractatus': Nominalistic or Realistic?". (...) An excellent beginning for a promising series.--D. P. B. (shrink)

This collection of fourteen interpretative essays on the philosophy of George Berkeley focuses specifically on Berkeley’s theory of the nature and variety of existing things. The collection is notable for containing the first four winners of the Turbayne International Berkeley Essay Prize. The seven essays in the first part, entitled “Idealism,” attempt to illuminate Berkeley’s notorious thesis that to be is to be perceived, that the _esse_ of sensible things is _percipi._ Most of the essays in this first part are (...) either direct or indirect responses to an influential interpretation of Berkeley’s idealism advanced thirty years ago by Edwin B. Allaire. The second part, “Volition, Action, and Causation,” contains four essays focusing on Berkeley’s volitionism, on his thesis that only the activities of minds are causally efficacious. “Vision and the Perceptual Objects,” the third part of the volume, deals with Berkeley’s theory of vision and his doctrine that all of the objects of perception depend on God’s will for their existence. (shrink)

In this book, Yaqub describes a simple conception of truth and shows that it yields a semantical theory that accommodates the whole range of our seemingly conflicting intuitions about truth. This conception takes the Tarskian biconditionals as correctly and completely defining the notion of truth. The semantical theory, which is called the revision theory, that emerges from this conception paints a metaphysical picture of truth as a property whose applicability is given by a revision process rather than by a fixed (...) extension. The main advantage of this revision process is its ability to explain why truth seems in many cases almost redundant, in others substantial, and yet in others paradoxical. Yaub offers a comprehensive defense of the revision theory of truth by developing consistent and adequate formal semantics for languages in which all sorts of problematic sentences can be constructed. Yaqub concludes by introducing a logic of truth that further demonstrates the adequacy of the revision theory. (shrink)

In a recent discussion of the notion of substance Miss Anscombe points out that the following three doctrines are very closely associated: the doctrine that proper names lack all connotation, are mere labels, the view that there is nothing essential to the individual, and the doctrine that individuals are bare particulars with no properties in and of themselves. In this article as well as in other writings she rejects all three of these doctrines. And, along with P. T. Geach, whose (...) position on this matter I take to be identical to hers, she defends a doctrine of proper names that is based upon this rejection. She is quite right in supposing that the notion of individuality embodied in these three doctrines is not a straw man. E. B. Allaire has recently defended the doctrine that there are bare particulars along with its corollaries about names and the nominal essence of individuals. He even thinks the doctrine can be defended on “common sense” grounds, independently of dialectical considerations. In this paper I wish to examine one of his arguments in defence of bare particulars. (shrink)

Universals: Loux, M. J. The existence of universals. Russell, B. The world of universals. Quine, W. V. O. On what there is. Pears, D. F. Universals. Strawson, P. F. Particular and general. Wolterstorff, N. Qualities. Bambrough, R. Universals and family resemblances. Donagan, A. Universals and metaphysical realism. Sellars, W. Abstract entities. Wolterstorff, N. On the nature of universals.--Particulars: Loux, M. J. Particulars and their individuation. Black. M. The identity of indiscernibles. Ayer, A. J. The identity of indiscernibles. O'Connor, D. J. (...) The identity of indiscernibles. Allaire, E. B. Bare particulars. Chappell, V. C. Particulars re-clothed. Allaire, E. B. Another look at bare particulars. Meiland, J. W. Do relations individuate? Long, D. C. Particulars and their qualities. Copi, I. Essence and accident. Chandler, H. S. Essence and accident. Plantinga, A. World and essence. (shrink)

This article examines Moltmann’s analysis of intensional transitive verbs , and argues that the analysis fails because the key notion it employs, ‘variable satisfier’, is inconsistent.

George Lakoff (in his book Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things(1987) and the paper "Cognitive semantics" (1988)) champions some radical foundational views. Strikingly, Lakoff opposes realism as a metaphysical position, favoring instead some supposedly mild form of idealism such as that recently espoused by Hilary Putnam, going under the name "internal realism." For what he takes to be connected reasons, Lakoff also rejects truth conditional model-theoretic semantics for natural language. This paper examines an argument, given by Lakoff, against realism and MTS. (...) We claim that Lakoff's argument has very little, if any, impact for linguistic semantics. (shrink)

Fārābī; Avicenna, 980-1037; Avempace, -1138 or 1139; logic; Islamic philosophy; history.